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It is one of the most popular leitmotif of comparative legal science that civil and common legal 
systems are converging2. The primary consideration behind this is, that the role of “precedents” are 
increasing in civilian legal systems, while statutory law’s importance is growing in common law. As 
McCormick states in the Introduction of a comparative study of precedent:  
 
To differentiate ‘civilian’ to ‘common law’ systems is a commonplace among lawyers. It is trite learning that 
precedents count for less in civilian legal systems than in those of the common law, and it has sometimes been 
doubted, whether they stand for anything much at all in civilian systems. The present work shows, the doubt to 
be groundless. Here it is shown that precedent counts for a great deal in civilian systems. The tendency to 
convergence between systems of the two types is a salient fact of the later twentieth century, although there 
remain real differences, some of great importance.3 
 
In 2012 we performed a research on more than 60 000 Hungarian judicial decisions, published on the 
website of State Office of Courts,4 (Országos Bírósági Hivatal) in order to explore an important aspect 
of the “precedential character” of the Hungarian law. The first, (quantitative) part of the research 
was computer-based: we collected and analysed all the citations to precedents within the text of the 
decisions and analysed the citation patterns. In the second (qualitative) phase we selected 520 
decisions randomly, read them, and recorded four additional aspects in a database. This paper shows 
the results of both, and divided into three main chapters.  
The first chapter will describe the theoretical and methodological background of the research;  the 
theoretical framework of precedent we worked with, including the differences between common law 
and civilian systems, and the importance of citations. For a better understanding I sketch the 
institutional background, structure, and types of the courts and “precedents” in Hungarian law, and 
the characteristics of the raw-material we worked with. I will also describe the methodological, and 
technical considerations behind the computer based analysis.  
The second chapter shows the results of the computer based citation analysis form different angles, 
and contains more than a dozen tables and charts. Following the tables, I am trying to give 
explanations and conclusions I have drawn from them. Analysis comprises the number of citations in 
different courts, (court levels and court branches), case-types, and legal fields. We observed the 
                                                          
1 The author thanks to the following persons: Tamás Grósz, for the preparation of the computer based 
statistics, Miklós Szabó for supporting the research in University of Miskolc, Zsolt Czékmann, for coordinating 
the research of the qualitative part, Péter Darák, for supporting the project, and all of my colleagues, who 
attended the workshop held at Curia in 27 November 2013, and made valuable contributions to the text.  
2 David, René –Brierley, John, E.C: Major Legal Systems in the World Today, An Introduction to the Comparative 
Study of Law, Steven and Sons, London, 133; Merryman, John Henry: On the Convergence (and Divergence) of 
the Civil Law and the Common Law, 357-388 17 Stan. J. Int'l L. 357 (1981) 358, and footnote 3.,  
3 MacCormick, D. Neil – Summers: Robert S: Interpreting Precedents, A Comparative Study, Ashgate, 
Dartmouth, 1997. 2 
4 http://www.birosag.hu/ugyfelkapcsolati-portal/anonim-hatarozatok-tara  
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dynamics of citations over the years, showing the change in time. We compared the use of different 
“precedent-types”, and so on.  
The third chapter contains the results of the qualitative research, and some final conclusions. It tries 
to answer questions, where machine made statistics is simply not enough: questions which can be 
properly analysed only contextually.  These are for example: the role, and status of precedent in legal 
reasoning, the link between use of precedent and the value of the case, the existence of 
distinguishing, and so on.  
 
I. Theoretical background of the research 
 
1. The theory of precedent in common law 
 
In common law systems judicial decisions are the primary sources of law. The idea of judicial 
precedent5, as a central element in legal reasoning, in my view rests upon four interconnected pillars:  
 The notion of stare decisis 
 The distinction between ratio decidendi, and obiter dicta,  
 The method of distinguishing,  
 And finally a general idea, that the “rule” is not the one that is explicitly written in the 
decision, but what makes law is the “spirit”. This notion is also formulated in a form, that 
precedents are not ‘saying’ but ‘doing’ something.  
 
The first constituent part of the theory of precedent is the concept of stare decisis, - the binding 
power of it, the idea, that courts must follow the decisions of the upper courts. Although we know, 
that the modern notion of stare decisis was not solidified before the middle of the 19th century6, the 
stare decisis is the real distinctive feature of the case law systems. This is the element, what is really 
missing in the civilian systems. Cases, even the most important decisions of the Supreme Court can 
be ignored by a civilian court – or at least this is, what theory says.  
 
The second pillar, on which the theory of precedent rests, and which is in very close interaction with 
the previous, is the differentiation of ratio decidendi and obiter dicta. It says, that only the ratio what 
is binding, and this should be separated from the incidental explications, “tangential observations”7 
and arguments within the reasoning. Already John Austin stated:  
 
Since no two cases are precisely alike, the decision of a specific case may partly turn upon reasons which are 
suggested to the judge by its specific peculiarities or differences. And that part of the decision which turns on 
those differences (or that part of the decision which consists of those special reasons), cannot serve as a 
precedent for subsequent decisions, and cannot serve as a rule or guide of conduct. The general reasons or 
principles of a judicial decision (as thus abstracted from any peculiarities of the case) are commonly styled, by -
writers on jurisprudence, the Ratio decidendi8 
 
                                                          
5 The notion of precedent, ratio decidendi, and stare decisis has an enormous literature. I cite here only those, 
which I used to formulate my ideas: Hart, H.L.A: The Concept of Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961. 134; 
Schauer, Frederick: Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571 (1986-1987), 573-574., and especially footnote 5.; Kempin, 
Frederick: Precedent and Stare Decisis, the Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 Am. J. Legal Hist. 28 (1959) 30; 
Duxbury The Nature and Authority of Precedent, Cambridge University Press, 2008; Stone, Julius: The Ratio of 
the Ratio Decidendi, 3 Am. J. Legal Hist. 28 (1959) 597; Goodhard, Arthur L.:Determining the Ratio Decidendi of 
a Case 40 Yale L. J. 161 (1930-1931); 10.; Siltala, Raimo: A Theory of Precedent, From Analytical Positivism to a 
Post-Analitical Philosophy of Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford- Portland, Oregon, 2000 
6 Kempin (see supra note 5) 31-32;  
7 Duxbury (see supra note 5) 26 
8 Goodhard (see supra note 5) cites Austin, John: Lectures on Jurisprudence, etc. (1885), 627, in note 2. 161 
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What is particularly interesting in this quotation is, the Austin is not speaking about different parts of 
the texts: what he is talking about is rather a distinction between a relationship of facts and rules of 
the case. Cases are alike, and if we create a rule, we have to abandon certain circumstances, in order 
to set up a proper rule. Later, (especially in America, as we will see later) ratio decidendi, as opposed 
to obiter dicta was theorized as different parts within the reasoning, separate textual elements: 
elements, that are important, and should be followed, and unimportant, that are not parts of the 
rule itself. Morover Julius Stone states: “this can mean is that the scope of the ratio decidendi of the 
precedent case will frequently not be determined or determinable until further decisions have been 
made;” 9  
The third pillar is, that, for the proper and wise handling of the precedent, in order to “create” a right 
ratio out of the spirit, (and not the text) of the decision, the judge have to exercise the art of 
distinguishing. This is a process, when the actors of the judicial process are recognizing what are the 
similarities, and differences between two or more cases, and argue, that the differences have an 
effect on the legal consequences. The method is closely connected to the method of analogy. In fact, 
Siltala states, that “the use of analogy, and distinguishing are the two sides of the same coin”10. 
When using the analogy, we disregard any dissimilarities between the two cases, while using the 
distinction we attach relevance to them.  
And finally the most general consideration is, - also as a consequence of the previous three, is that 
precedents are rather ‘doing’ something than they ‘say’ something. As Tiersma states:  
 
As a consequence, the common law remained conceptually distinct from statutory law. What mattered was the 
court's decision and the general principle that underlay it, and not the precise words in which the decision was 
expressed. As Mansfield said: "The law does not consist of particular cases, but of general principles, which are 
illustrated and explained by these cases." Mansfield also noted that "[t]he reason and spirit of cases make law; 
not the letter of particular precedents” 11 
 
To put this in another way, Holdsworth, when writing about the evolution of case law and citing 
Coke, Hale and Blackstone finally concludes, that “cases do not make law, but are only the best 
evidence of what the law is.”12 Duxbury in his book also argues, that “lawyers and judges will 
commonly refer to as a ‘rule’, even though this rule might not have been expressly formulated in the 
case law”13. Thus, in case-law text has a secondary importance.  
Although Tiersma argues, that there is a huge difference between the law of Britain and the U.S., and 
one of the main point of difference is that in the U.S. there is an ongoing process of “textualization” 
of the precedent, there is still an important presumption in common law systems, that it is the 
“spirit” of the decision, what really counts. Judges have to follow the ratio, the principles14 behind 
the decision, and not the wording, what these decisions are using.  
 
2. The theory of judicial practice, and the role of courts in civilian systems 
 
My preliminary hypothesis is, that if these four pillars are not present in the judicial process, we 
cannot talk about case law, and proper theory of precedent. Let’s see it one by one.  
The lack of stare decisis is clear. In civil law systems it is not obligatory to follow previous cases. This 
does not mean that courts do not follow de facto previous cases. But on one hand, if they do it, 
                                                          
9 Stone (see supra note 5) 607 
10 Siltala (see supra note 5) 94 
11 This is the argument of Hart, (see supra note 5), but plays a central role in Tiersma’s argumentation either, 
Tiersma, Peter, M: The Textualization of Precedent, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1187 (2006-2007), 1202  
12 Holdsworth, W. S: Case Law, 50 L. Q. Rev. 180 (1934), 184 
13 Duxbury, (see supra note 5) 23 
14 Holdsworth, (see supra note 12) quotes Frederick Pollock: “Judicial authority belongs not to the exact words 
used in this or that judgment, nor even to all the reasons given, but only to the principles recognised and 
applied as necessary grounds of the decision.” 
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within the reasoning they handle precedents differently. On the other, if they do not follow them, 
normally the upper courts have no right to criticize them for this. Even if in some legal systems, (like 
in Hungarian) there are certain types of instruments, issued by the Supreme Court which are 
obligatory, these instruments are dealing with isolated problems, and are formulated as a statutory 
amendment.  
 
The ratio-obiter distinction is also missing. The ideology of statutory law is incompatible with any idea 
that there are important, and less important parts within any legal text. This applies for judicial 
decisions too. As we will see later, in Hungarian judicial practice the “ratio” of the judicial decision is 
formulated in a form of a headnote, and this headnote functions as a legal amendment. Even if 
courts are citing a case, in 95% they cite only the headnote, and build the text in their reasoning 
similarly to law-amendments.  
In close connection with the abovementioned two features, distinguishing does not exist. It is 
substituted with interpretation. If a factual situation does not entirely fit to the original model of the 
general norm, judges have to interpret the text of the norm. It is not only about “penumbra” and 
“core” meaning15, but has something to do with the theory of coherence. Interpretation should be 
performed in the light of other amendments, because amendments form a system. 16 Interpretation 
should be done in a systematic way, one amendment standing alone has practically no meaning. 17 
 And finally it is clear, that civilian systems are textual – they are bound, evolving, and stick to 
authoritative texts. Interpretation should ultimately stick to the wording, the text of the law. What 
counts is what the law ‘says’, and not what it ‘does’.  If we take a short look to the history of civil law, 
it is clear, that already the genesis of these systems are hopelessly bound to texts – to Digesta, than 
to Corpus Iuris,18 and to the great Civil Codes of France, Prussia, Germany, Switzerland, and Austria.  
Therefore the primary tool of handling of alike cases, and the adaptation of the law to the changing 
socio-cultural and economic circumstances is the interpretation of texts. The work of the judge is, (at 
least on an ideological level) mainly operations with, and manipulations of texts. This has two 
additional consequence.  
It seems that reasoning in general is different in civilian systems. These systems are based on norms, 
which are abstract and general in wording, and judicial decisions tend to show themselves rather as 
logical operations, then a rhetorical effort, where the result (the decision) is directly coming from the 
premises, and is not aiming to persuasion. Following Szabó’s arguments19 we can distinguish in this 
respect four types, how two texts (the text of the norm, and the text of the decision) can be 
connected. These types are representing a certain “grades of closeness”. According to his theory20, 
the judicial process can be viewed as an ongoing process of “linguistic conversions”, and there are 
differences, how these texts are “converted” to each other. The tightest connection is “inference”, 
when the two texts are in a logical connection. The second is the “justification” which only 
demonstrates that the two texts are (without logical controversy) can be inosculated. The third type 
is “reasoning”: this connects the two texts not in a logical, but in a rhetorical way, and its final goal is 
the persuasion. We might add, that, during the analysis of the Hungarian decisions, it turned out, 
that there is a fourth type, (which can be categorized as the extreme version of the first one): the 
“demonstration”. It is the way, when there is a reference to authoritative texts without even citing 
                                                          
15 Hart (see supra note 5) 134 
16 Savigny Savigny, Friedrich Carl von: System des heutigen römischen Rechts, Berlin, 1840, 262 
17 Somló, Felix: Juristische Grundlehre, Verlag von Felix Meiner, Leipzig, 1917, 97 
18 Berman, Harold J: Law and Revolution, The Formation of the Weestern Legal Tradition, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge Mass., etc. 1983, 127-131 
19 Szabó, Miklós: A jogászi érvelés változása, (Change in Legal Reasoning): Szabadfalvi (ed.): Facultas nata, 
Miskolc, Bíbor, 400-401 
20 Szabó, Miklós: Nyelvi átfordítások a jogban, (Lingusitic Conversions in Law) in: Szabó, Miklós. (ed.): Nyelvében 
a jog, nyelvhasználat a jogi eljárásban, Bíbor, Miskolc, 2010., 9-28.; English version: Law as Translation. Archiv 
für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie. (ARSP Beiheft Nr. 91) 2004, 60-68 
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the text. This type, when courts only mention the “long standing judicial practice” without any 
further explanation, is surprisingly frequent in Hungarian judicial decisions.  
From a broader perspective this also has a close relation with certain sociological and institutional 
factors. These are the hierarchical structure of the courts, the authority, and style of judicial decision, 
and the structure of the profession of judges. The hierarchy of courts has a significance mainly 
because on the top of the judicial system the Supreme Court stands, which, in most of the civilian 
systems has a task of “ensure the unity” of the judicial decisions. Supreme Court – besides its 
cassation right in individual cases, has an additional tool to ensure unity. It is issuing different types 
of instruments, summaries of cassation cases in case journals, and “guidances”, in a form of 
“unification decision”, or in other “Abstract Opinion” forms21. A further sociological factor is the 
style, and the authority of the judicial decisions. Since the decisions tend to show themselves as a 
result of a logical process, they are normally short, and less explanatory as in common law systems. 
They rarely speak to the laymen, and their overall respect is a lot lower, than in common law. Finally 
there is the authority of the judiciary. This is in close connection with the “career type”, life-long 
appointed, bureaucratic character of the profession.22  
The attitude towards the judicial decisions as sources of law can be classified to two groups in the 
Hungarian judicial practice. The first is, the judge made law is not allowed, (and it is not existing), 
since only the law-maker can create new law. This was the official point of view of the early 
communist jurisprudence23. Later the ideology became slightly more permissive, and another idea 
was articulated, which can be called the “restricted role of judge-made law”. According to this, the 
judge-made law is a “bad necessity”, and only a temporary phenomenon. Since the text of the laws 
can be adjusted to the changing socio-economical needs slowly, the first steps might be taken by the 
courts. But the legislation must build in the legal solutions elaborated by the courts to the text of the 
statutes, as soon as possible24. Since new problems and needs are continuously emerging, this whole 
process is cyclical.  
 
3. Signs of convergence 
 
All, what was said before seem to be rebuttals of the convergence. But there are strong pro 
arguments either.   
From the end of the 19th century Supreme Courts all around Europe were granted a right to ensure 
legal unity25. Actually the concept of legal unity is the civilian counterpart of stare decisis, since with 
the unification process the supreme courts can overrule the diverging practice of a particular court.  
After the 2nd World War in civil law countries Constitutional Courts were established, which followed 
a case-law method26, further strengthening the culture of precedents within the civilian systems. A 
third factor was, that from the end of the ‘50s, an extensive publication of judicial decisions was 
                                                          
21 The “abstract resolution” is also existing in Poland. See Morawski, Lech– Zirk-Sadowsky, Marek: Precedent in 
Poland, in: MacCormick - Summers (see supra note 5) 220.  
22 David, (see supra note 2), 140 
23 See e.g. Szamel, Lajos: A jogforrások, (Sources of Law) Budapest, KJK, 1958. 130-132. (in Hungarian)  
24 See e.g. Orosz, Árpád: Az egyedi ügyekhez igazodás magyar gyakorlata a polgári ügyszakban, (The Practice of 
Following Individual Cases in Hungary in Civil Law Branch) Jogesetek Magyarázata 2012/3 79 – 82 (in 
Hungarian) 
25 E.g. Art 95 (3) of the German Grundgesetz says: (3) Zur Wahrung der Einheitlichkeit der Rechtsprechung ist 
ein Gemeinsamer Senat der in Absatz 1 genannten Gerichte zu bilden. Das Nähere regelt ein Bundesgesetz. The 
Act mentioned is the Gesetz zur Wahrung der Einheitlichkeit der Rechtsprechung der obersten Gerichtshöfe des 
Bundes. The Hungarian solution is very similar to this.  
26 On the history of German Constitutional Court see: Kommers, Donald P.; Miller, Russell A.: Das 
Bundesverfassungsgericht: Procedure, Practice and Policy of the German Federal Constitutional Court 3 Journal 
of Comparative Law (2008), 194-211. On the case-law of the Court see: Alexy, Robert – Dreier, Ralph: 
Precedent in the Federal Republic of Germany. in: MacCormick –Summers (see supra note 5) 17. 
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started by the commercial publishers, and by the courts themselves27. And finally Internet initiated 
dramatic changes, when – partly as a consequence of Freedom of Information legislation, huge 
amount of (unedited) judicial decisions were published on the internet, and effective search engines 
further increase the visibility of these decisions.  
All these developments were pointing to one direction: the number of citations in judicial decisions 
started to increase in civilian systems. I think this has driven certain authors28 to develop a theory, 
which argues, that civilian systems has their own method of handling cases, namely the “reasoning 
with previous cases” which could be the equivalent of the “case-law method”. I will be arguing in this 
article, that there is no such method, at least not in Hungarian law. The use of precedents in basic 
outlines is similar to the use of statutory amendments.  
 
4. The cognitive importance of citations  
 
As it was shown in the previous part, the mystical notion of the binding power of the “unwritten 
principles” behind the law has been slowly superseded by the textualization of the precedent, both in 
England, and in the U.S, albeit with a different intensity. The speciality of America was, contrary to 
England, that at the end of the 19th century, right after the invention of the type-writer, the number 
of published cases increased dramatically29. This caused turbulence in several fields30, but one of the 
most spectacular was, that separating the “good” law from “bad” proven to be harder, and harder.  
This was the reason of emergence of Citators. These are tables that show the later mentioning, and 
also the context of mentioning of a decision in other decisions. The best known amongst these 
citators was the one published by Frank Shepard in 1875. The Shepard is based on a very simple idea: 
if a certain decision is mentioned in a later one, it is recorded and shown after the decision, together 
with the context. The context of the citation is measured basically by two parameters: the first is 
indicating the agreement, (from totally negative to totally positive mentioning: the dimension of 
accord), while the second is showing the impact of the citation to the decision, (the dimension of 
weight31).  
 
                                                          
27 Kavass, Igor I.: Law Reporting: Comparisons between Western Europe and Common Law Countries, 5 
International Journal of Law Libraries (1977), 104-120 o. „An increasing number of experts on this subject (…) 
have observed for some time a gradual drift towards a more extensive publication and use of judicial decisions 
in Western European countries. (…) They do (…) perform several important socio political functions which are 
not different form similar developments in the use of judicial decisions in other economically advanced 
countries, irrespective of whether their legal systems are based on Common Law or not.” (105) 
28 Jan Komárek: Reasoning with Previous Decisions: Beyond the Doctrine of Precedent. Americal Journal of 
Comparative Law, Vol. 61. (2013), 149-171, 156-157 
29 Mr. John West, the founder of the West Publishing Company himself regards this incidence a turning point in 
the history of law reports. West, John B.: The Multiplicity of Reports, 2 Law Libr. J. 1 (1909-1910) 45 
30 Here I just mention the problem of indices, the uniform numbering of cases, and the efforts of establishing a 
centralised law reporter instead of the „multiplicity of reports.” West (1909), 5 
31 Rombauer: Legal Problem Solving, p. 154 
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It is more than an interesting coincidence, that the method of the Shepard inspired Eugene 
Garfield32, to create the Science Citation Index, which later became the most popular method of 
measuring the impact, the importance of a scientific work.33 Nowadays the primary tool for 
measuring the importance of an article, a publication forum (journal), and a scientist is based on that 
method. The frequency, and the context of citations, as well as the importance of the citing 
authorities became also a very important (if not the most important) part of the Google-algorithm, 
the PageRank. Search engines before Google were all based of two methods: the free-text search, 
and the meta-tags put on webpages. But it turned out very quickly, that the data published on 
internet exceeds the amount, that can be handled this way, and the only usable method is, if 
relevance ranking is based on measurable traces of cognitive authority, generated by human 
knowledge – hyperlinks, citations.34  
 
5. Background, methodology and scope of the research 
 
5.1. The structure of the Hungarian court system 
 
The Hungarian Court system has four levels. The 111 local courts are the courts of first instance. The 
second level courts are the County Courts, of which there are 20 (the 19 counties, and the Capital 
Court). There are four Appellate Courts. On the top of the judicial system is the Supreme Court 
(Curia).  
Courts are organized into three departments, and further to branches. The main departments are 
civil department, (subdivided into normal civil branch, dealing with cases between private parties, 
and business branch, dealing with cases between business organisations), penal department, and 
                                                          
32 Eugene Garfield himself was telling the story of Science Citation Index in a video-interview: “People don’t 
even simply know this: there was no citation index at that time for larger rules. It came later. That came out, 
that Shepard produced that citation index long before we started SCI, because librarians started to complain, 
that why don’t they have a citation index for journals. (…) And I went down to the reference room, and that’s 
when I saw what Shepard Citation was, and I literally screamed, (…) When I saw Shepard, I realized, that the 
index had to be inverted, because they had the document as the focus, and the statements to be followed.” 
http://www.webofstories.com/play/eugene.garfield/25;jsessionid=1C696C9302267E140AE26CB1273D2833  
33 And it cannot be a simple coincidence, that later the Google, which was revolutionized the search on Internet 
is also based on citation, (hyperlinks), and it is also measuring the importance of the place of publication either 
with different tools.  
34 Ződi, Zsolt: A Google, a jogi adatbázisok és a szöveg számítógépes uralásának három módja (Google, legal 
databases and the three ways of text control by computers) Infokommunikáció és jog, 46/2011., 175-178 (in 
Hungarian)  
Dimension 
of weight 
Dmension of 
accord 
Overruled  
Followed  
Distinguished 
Criticized  
Limited  
Parallel  
Questioned 
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administrative and labour department, (subdivided into an administrative branch, dealing with the 
supervision of the decisions of the administrative organs, and labour, dealing with labour law cases).  
Supreme Court has a double function: it functions as a Court of Cassation in finished cases, (as a 
court of third instance), and, similarly to the German system has a legal unification role, i.e. its task is 
to monitor the jurisdiction of lower courts, and in case of divergence issue certain instruments.  
Appellate courts’ (Táblabíróságok, 4) main function is to decide cases on the second instance, that 
were started on the county level. (Normally the local courts are the courts of first instance, so cases 
started at county level are special because of their subject matter, - e.g. copyright, - or because of 
the value of the lawsuit.) They also decide administrative cases on the second instance. They have no 
labour branch, because labour issues are decided on the county level on the first instance, and on the 
second instance too – the appellate cases are in the appellate division, while the first instance labour 
suits are on the first instance labour courts, which are organised only per county.  
County courts (Törvényszékek, formerly Megyei bíróságok - 20) are deciding civil, and penal cases 
having an “important” or high value subject matter on the first instance, and appellate suits in cases 
started at local level. They are the first instance courts for administrative and labour issues.  
 
Local courts (Járásbíróságok, formerly Helyi bíróságok - 111) are the courts of first instance. 
Consequently, they are competent in minor issues, and they do not have a labour and administrative 
branch.  
 
5.2. Types of decisions - unedited decisions (citing documents), and edited 
precedents (cited documents)  
 
5.2.1. Unedited decisions – the analysed citing documents 
 
For our research we sharply differentiated the citing and the cited documents (precedents). Recently 
cca. 500 000 lawsuits are in a year on Hungarian courts, and cca. 11 000 is published. More than 90% 
of these cases are published under the FOI act35, in an unedited, original form, (only the data of the 
parties are deleted from the decision.) This was the database for the research of the citing 
documents, because this shows the day-to-day practice of the courts in the original form. Since the 
publication started at 2007, and the research was made on the database closed at 2012, the number 
of analysed decisions was 61 512.  
 
  Civil Business Labour Administrative Penal Total  
Supreme Court 4873 867 1465 5496 1166 13867 
Appellate Courts 9907 3548 0 1172 2704 17331 
County Courts 10705 4297 1588 7934 3066 27590 
Local Courts 1396 314 0 0 1014 2724 
Total  26881 9026 3053 14602 7950 61512 
 
Table 1 – Unedited judgments (UEJ) in the CJD – Citing documents 
 
 
5.2.2. Edited decisions – cited documents 
 
We analysed in this pile the citations to edited “precedents” that are the 10% of the published 
decisions. In this case we went back to as early as possible. The different journals were started at 
                                                          
35 The Act on Electronic Freedom of Information (Act XC. of 2005. § 16.) introduced the Collection of Judicial 
Decisions, and publication was started at 2007. Recently the Act on the Organisation and Administration of 
Courts, (Act CLXI. of 2011. § 163.) is regulating the issue.  
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different times, and it is also varying how long in time the decisions are available in the databases. 
The structure of the precedents, and the date they are published from are the following.  
 
 Type of edited case Issuer of decisions Publisher 
Start date of 
collection 
Number of 
decisions in 
total 
Uniformity Decisions (UD)  Supreme Court Official 1999 (1977) 169 
Abstract Opinions (AO)  Supreme Court Official 1975 1162 
Principal Decisions of the Curia (PD)  Supreme Court Official 1999 2441 
Court Decisions of the Curia (CD)  Supreme Court Official 1975 20118 
Decisions from Collection of Court 
Decisions Journal (CCD)  Appellate Courts Private 2002 2722 
Decisions from Administrative and 
Business Cases Collection (ABC)  Supreme Court Private 1992 5636 
Constitutional Court Decisions (CC) Constitutional Court Official 1990 2870 
Total       35118 
 
Table 2 – Edited decisions, “precedents” – Cited documents 
 
The main issuer of precedents is the Supreme Court. It is publishing four types of instruments.  
The first is the Uniformity Decision (UD) (before 1990 these had different names) which is deciding a 
controversial legal question, which led to conflicting decisions. It is formulated like a decision, and – 
apart from some rare examples – it is deciding only one debated legal question. This form of act has 
a binding power on lower courts.  
On the second level there are non-binding explanatory documents: Abstract Opinions (AO) of the 
professional branches, which are passed by the body of judges working in the same branch, called 
College: therefore they have a slightly misleading name of “College Opinions”, in Hungarian jargon. 
This type has a great importance. These quasi-norms are not deciding one particular restricted legal 
problem, but normally they are dealing with a bulk of controversial legal questions within a field of 
law (like the problems of joint property, or legal aspects of libel cases, etc.). Though these acts has no 
legal binding power, courts do follow, and use them.  
Finally on the third level there are two types of “precedents”. Both are individual cases selected from 
the practice of the Supreme Court as a Court of Cassation. The first type is the normal decision, called 
court decision – CD) while the other is selected because of its “principal importance”. (Principal 
decision - PD). Both of these two are again not abstract ones, because they are restricted to one 
particular legal question.  
All of the abovementioned four types of instruments of the Supreme Court are published in the 
Official Journal of the Supreme Court. (Decisions of the Curia – Kúriai Döntések, formerly Bírósági 
Határozatok, BH)  
Commercial publishers are also publishing decisions. There are two influential journal, both 
published by Wolters Kluwer Hungary, the Collection of Court Decisions, (CCD), publishing some 400 
cases per year, and the Administrative and Business Cases Collection (ABC), publishing cca. the same 
amount.   
Besides the abovementioned types, there is one additional type of “precedent-type” which is 
frequently cited, the decisions of the Constitutional Court. Constitutional Court was established in 
1989, and it is publishing cca. 100 decisions in a year. It has its own official journal, but the most 
important ones are published in the Official Gazette (Magyar Közlöny) too.  
All of the abovementioned decision-types (except constitutional court decisions) have one in 
common: they have an edited headnote, which is typically one-two, (UD, PD, CD, CCD, ABC) or more 
(in case of AO 5-15) amendments. These amendments are formulated like rules of an Act. They 
normally have a hypothesis, and a disposition, in this way:  
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“If the amount collected during the enforcement procedure does not cover the whole amount of the enforcement 
costs defined in Paragraph 1 Article 164 of the Vht. (Act on Judicial Execution), firstly the unpaid enforcement 
duties and enforcement costs paid by the state have to be settled from the amount described above. 
The amount left after the above shall be used to proportionally settle - if there is not further privileged costs - the 
further costs arising in connection with the initiation, ordering and conducting of the enforcement.”36 
 
5.3. The operative methodology of the research 
 
The operative methodology of the research was the following. We took a commercial legal database, 
which contains both the citing and the cited documents. Within the database there are metadata 
attached to the documents, like type of document, department and branch, issuing court, date of 
issue, subject of the decision, etc. Further, the citations are also stored in a database in a form of 
hyperlinks, where the starting point of the link, and the end point of the link is exactly identified. We 
simply made queries from different angles, - that is how the tables are created. (For example, how 
many documents contain a citation to a precedent, how these citations is spread per court level, per 
branch, per subject of case, per time, and so on.)  
Here I have to mention certain limits of a computer based analysis of this type. Machines do not 
understand the text, the context. They perform logical and mathematical operations with strings, no 
matter how complex these mathematical operations, and the underlying rules are. They compare 
two data-sets, (like a vocabulary and a text), count certain data, as a result of a query. Therefore 
machine made statistics have certain limits. The first, and most important is, that it will not recognize 
any string, which is not written in the defined format. The second is, that it does not understand 
even the basic context of the mentioning. It makes a huge difference if a decision is mentioned in a 
way, that “the court followed the XY decision”, or like this, “the court ignored the plaintiff’s 
reference to XY decision, because its facts are different from the case under investigation”. The 
machine cannot understand who proposed, mentioned the case at the first time. Overall, the 
machine made statistics can give a superficial, quantitative picture about some simple, measurable 
parameters of the judicial practice. For any contextual analysis the decisions should be read and 
understood by humans. This does not exclude, that with the development of IT, and Artificial 
Intelligence more and more of these problems can be eliminated, and more and more contextual 
questions can be answered by machines too.  
 
II. Computer based analysis of the citations (qualitative 
research)  
 
1. The frequency of citations, court levels, branches, document types 
 
The first simple question which was observed, that how many of the citing documents, (unedited 
judgments) is containing any citations, references to any edited decisions. We made the statistics for 
all court levels. The following tables are showing the figures per court level. In the rows there are the 
branches, and in the columns there are the cited decision types.  It is important to mention, that the 
“sum of documents containing citation” is not the sum of the previous columns, because one 
document can contain a citation of two different types of precedents.  
  
                                                          
36 Civil Law Uniformity Decision Nr. 2/2013 
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1.1. Supreme Court (Curia)  
  
Number of 
documents 
Total 
published  UD  AO PD CD CCD ABC CC 
Total 
containing 
citation 
Civil branch 4873 62 569 291 1045 78 13 98 1791 
Business branch 867 41 68 94 144 22 5 8 275 
Labour branch 1465 19 156 135 569 8 4 56 731 
Administrative 
branch  5496 109 171 144 610 5 166 197 1146 
Penal branch 1166 130 88 44 291 2 2 27 485 
Curia total 13867 361 1052 708 2659 115 190 386 4428 
  
Table 3a – Citations to edited precedents – Curia, figures 
 
 UD  AO PD CD CCD ABC CC 
Total 
containing 
citation 
Civil branch 1% 12% 6% 21% 2% 0% 2% 37% 
Business branch 5% 8% 11% 17% 3% 1% 1% 32% 
Labour branch 1% 11% 9% 39% 1% 0% 4% 50% 
Administrative 
branch  2% 3% 3% 11% 0% 3% 4% 21% 
Penal branch 11% 8% 4% 25% 0% 0% 2% 42% 
Curia total 3% 8% 5% 19% 1% 1% 3% 32% 
 
Table 3b – Citations to edited precedents – Curia, percentages 
 
1.2. Appellate courts 
Number of 
documents 
Total 
published  UD  AO PD CD CCD ABC CC 
Total 
containing 
citation 
Civil branch 9907 154 1869 663 1962 739 45 829 4088 
Business branch 3548 161 386 368 810 462 23 34 1304 
Labour branch 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Administrative 
branch  1172 48 113 22 41 3 20 44 238 
Penal branch 2704 211 275 41 511 1 2 40 873 
Appellate courts 
total 17331 574 2643 1094 3324 1205 90 947 6503 
 
Table 4a – Citations to edited precedents – Appellate courts, figures 
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 UD  AO PD CD CCD ABC CC 
Total 
containing 
citation 
Civil branch 2% 19% 7% 20% 7% 0% 8% 41% 
Business branch 5% 11% 10% 23% 13% 1% 1% 37% 
Labour branch na. na. na. na. na. na. na. na. 
Administrative 
branch  4% 10% 2% 3% 0% 2% 4% 20% 
Penal branch 8% 10% 2% 19% 0% 0% 1% 32% 
Appellate courts 
total 3% 15% 6% 19% 7% 1% 5% 38% 
 
Table 4b – Citations to edited precedents – Appellate courts, percentages 
 
1.3. County courts 
 
Number of 
documents 
Total 
published  UD  AO PD CD CCD ABC CC 
Total 
containing 
citation 
Civil branch 10705 103 1761 434 1522 577 24 777 3578 
Business branch 4297 110 332 257 584 302 14 32 1051 
Labour branch 1588 31 346 188 474 4 4 63 903 
Administrative 
branch  7934 110 1644 181 275 11 207 276 2220 
Penal branch 3066 200 212 46 369 6 0 35 702 
County courts 
total 27590 554 4295 1106 3224 900 249 1183 8454 
 
Table 5a – Citations to edited precedents – County courts, figures 
 
 UD  AO PD CD CCD ABC CC 
Total 
containing 
citation 
Civil branch 1% 16% 4% 14% 5% 0% 7% 33% 
Business branch 3% 8% 6% 14% 7% 0% 1% 24% 
Labour branch 2% 22% 12% 30% 0% 0% 4% 57% 
Administrative 
branch  1% 21% 2% 3% 0% 3% 3% 28% 
Penal branch 7% 7% 2% 12% 0% 0% 1% 23% 
County courts 
total 2% 16% 4% 12% 3% 1% 4% 31% 
 
Table 5b – Citations to edited precedents – County courts, percentages 
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1.4. Local courts 
 
Number of 
documents 
Total 
published  UD  AO PD CD CCD ABC CC 
Total 
containing 
citation 
Civil branch 1396 7 171 61 198 46 6 30 411 
Business branch 314 2 26 9 27 13 0 1 55 
Labour branch 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Administrative 
branch  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Penal branch 1014 23 25 11 80 0 0 12 142 
Local courts total 2724 32 222 81 305 59 6 43 608 
 
Table 6a – Citations to edited precedents – Local courts, figures 
 
 UD  AO PD CD CCD ABC CC 
Total 
containing 
citation 
Civil branch 1% 3% 4% 14% 3% 0% 2% 29% 
Business branch 1% 2% 3% 9% 4% 0% 0% 18% 
Labour branch na. na. na. na. na. na. na. na. 
Administrative 
branch  
na. na. na. na. na. na. na. na. 
Penal branch 2% 1% 1% 8% 0% 0% 1% 14% 
Local courts total 1% 2% 3% 11% 2% 0% 2% 22% 
 
Table 6b – Citations to edited precedents – Local courts, percentages 
 
1.5. Total  
 
Number of 
documents 
Total 
published  UD  AO PD CD CCD ABC CC 
Total 
containing 
citation 
Civil branch 26881 326 4370 1449 4727 1440 88 1734 9868 
Business branch 9026 314 812 728 1565 799 42 75 2685 
Labour branch 3053 50 502 323 1043 12 8 119 1634 
Administrative 
branch  14602 267 1928 347 926 19 393 517 3604 
Penal branch 7950 564 600 142 1251 9 4 114 2202 
All courts total 61512 1521 8212 2989 9512 2279 535 2559 19993 
 
Table 7a – Citations to edited precedents – all courts, figures 
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 UD  AO PD CD CCD ABC CC 
Total 
containing 
citation 
Civil branch 1% 16% 5% 18% 5% 0% 6% 37% 
Business branch 3% 9% 8% 17% 9% 0% 1% 30% 
Labour branch 2% 16% 11% 34% 0% 0% 4% 54% 
Administrative 
branch  2% 13% 2% 6% 0% 3% 4% 25% 
Penal branch 7% 8% 2% 16% 0% 0% 1% 28% 
All courts total 2% 13% 5% 15% 4% 1% 4% 33% 
 
Table 7b – Citations to edited precedents – all courts, percentages 
 
1.6. Relative popularity of the precedent types 
 
We created one more simple figure. We wanted to know the “impact factor” of the individual 
precedent types. For this we simply divided the number of citations to different precedent types, 
with their total number available in databases. (Table 7a total figures divided by table 2 total figures).  
 
  
Number of 
decisions in 
total 
Number of 
documents 
citing the 
decision type Impact ratio 
Uniformity Decisions (UD)  169 1521 9 
Abstract Opinions 1162 8212 7,1 
Principal Decisions of the Curia 2441 2989 1,2 
Court Decisions of the Curia (CD)  20118 9512 0,5 
Decision from Collection of Court Decisions Journal (CCD) 
– private collection 2722 2279 0,8 
Decision from Administrative and Business Cases 
Collection (ABC) – private collection 5636 535 0,1 
Constitutional Court Decisions 2870 2559 0,9% 
Total 35118 27607  
 
Table 8 – Impact of different precedent types 
 
1.7. Conclusions 
 
We can see, that nearly exactly 1/3 of the published 61 512 judgements contain a citation to 
precedents. But this overall figure varies both per branch, and per court level.  
What concerns court level, Curia and county courts are on the average level, while appellate courts 
are above, local courts are below this average. The plus of the appellate court is coming from the 
citations to their own decisions published in their own journal. What is surprising, that they cite the 
decisions of the Curia more frequently than of other courts too, or, by the Curia itself, and this 
surplus is generated by all branches. If we take into account, that the Abstract Opinions’ citation 
index is growing, going downwards, than the explanation could be, that citations are not just a 
contribution to the legal reasoning towards the parties, but it is also a tool of compliance towards the 
upper courts.  
The analysis per branch shows an even greater dispersion. Labour branch overtops with its 50%, 
followed by the other two civil branches, the civil, and the business branch. Penal law is the fourth in 
the row, while administrative is the last one. But if we examine the branches together with the court 
level, the picture is more mixed, because citation willingness is fluctuating across the court levels. For 
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example the citation in penal branch at Curia is quite high, even higher than civil law branches’, and 
this plus is equally caused by all precedent types. Uniformity decisions for example are very popular 
authorities at Curia, and cited significantly more frequently compared to other branches.  
An obvious explanation could be that differences are caused mainly by the civil law – public law 
distinction. Rules are typically dispositive in civil law, and cogent in public law branches, and in penal 
law the nullum crimen sine lege principle is further restricting the available interpretative and 
argumentative space of the judge. But the Curia’s citation activism on penal field seem to contradict 
to this. The explanation could be, that in penal field the space for interpretation, and possibility to 
rely on precedents remains the monopoly of the Curia, which is reinforcing from time to time its own 
practice.  
Tables show the popularity of different types of precedents too. Court Decisions (CD) are the most 
popular case-types. We can find a citation to these type of precedents in 20% of all published cases, 
and more than the half of the citations is a CD citation. Here there is a sharp difference: upper courts 
(Curia, Appellate Courts) cite around 25%, while lower courts (County and Local courts) around 15%. 
But at lower courts, and especially at County courts this lower number is counterbalanced by the 
more frequent use of Abstract Opinions. Lower courts use the AO more frequently than precedents.  
Further deepens the picture, if we see the relative importance (impact) of the precedent types. (The 
impact is 1 if one decision is cited in one document) Uniformity decision’s 8 is not surprising: this is 
the only obligatory instrument. But Abstract Opinion’s high impact (7,1 ) shows, that this a very 
widely used , and popular precedent-type.  What is surprising, is that the privately published CCD has 
the same high impact ratio, which is even higher than the CD’s, the official collection’s) The 
explanation is , that courts more willingly cite the fresher decisions. The nearly 10 000 CD ‘s majority 
is in a “sleeping” mode, while the fresher ones are cited  even more frequently than CCD.37
                                                          
37 We have a chart on the age of the cited precedents too. For reference see the Hungarian version of this text: 
http://jog.tk.mta.hu/uploads/files/mtalwp/2014_01_Zodi_Zsolt.pdf p. 42.  
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2. The change of citations of precedents in time 
2.1. Values 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Összes 
 Total Citing Total Citing Total Citing Total Citing Total Citing Total Citing Total Citing 
Curia  931 231 2255 576 2547 717 2772 948 2905 981 2457 882 13867 4335 
Appellate Courts 1477 452 2918 963 3021 1069 3435 1275 3776 1435 2704 1153 17331 6347 
County Courts 4955 1366 5648 1613 6031 1822 5809 2024 4169 1495 978 399 27590 8719 
Local Courts 754 161 666 147 631 151 422 88 223 33 28 4 2724 584 
Total 8117 2210 11487 3299 12230 3759 12438 4335 11073 3944 6167 2438 61512 19985 
 
Table 9 –Number of total judgments and citing documents between 2007 and 2012 
 
 
2.2. Percentages 
 
 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Összes 
Curia  25% 26% 28% 34% 34% 36% 31% 
Appellate Courts 31% 33% 35% 37% 38% 43% 37% 
County Courts 28% 29% 30% 35% 36% 41% 32% 
Local Courts 21% 22% 24% 21% 15% 14% 21% 
Total 27% 29% 31% 35% 36% 40% 32% 
 
Table 10 – Changes of documents containing citations in percentage per court level  
 
 
 
 
Chart to table 9  
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2.3. Conclusions 
 
These tables show a clear picture. Apart from the local courts38 the number of citations is increasing 
in time. The growth is unbroken, minimum 1%, but in some years 2-4%. The difference between the 
court levels stays stable. We have no data from the previous years, but I assume this was the picture 
before the start of the database.  
This has something to do with the change in attitudes, and I assume this is a self-reinforcing process. 
The availability of the decisions, precedents, cases, and especially the more and more effective 
search engines, and publication methods39, the electronic publication is generating more citations to 
them. The parties want to win the case, and reasoning with previous cases is one tool for this. If a 
party cites a precedent, the counterparty should also argue with something, and the judges must 
somehow reflect on the citations.  
However this, in itself not a decisive argument, that Hungarian law is converging to case-laws, 
because these, as other statistical figures should be interpreted together with the results of the 
qualitative research, which shows a different picture.  
 
3. The impact of fields of law, and sub-fields of law to citations of precedents 
 
3.1. Some methodological remarks to the tables 
 
One of our hypothesis was, that the field of law (case-type) is strongly influencing the precedent 
intensity, and there is a great difference between case-types. The following tables present the 
number of citations to precedents per court department, (business, civil, labour, administrative and 
penal) and per field of law (case-type). We prepared statistics only for the most frequent case-
types.40 Within one row, on the left side, there are 7 data, namely the total number of judgments 
within the database, (2 column) and the number of precedent-citing documents within the field, (3 
column) followed by the number of citing documents per precedent type (4-8 columns). The right 
part of the table shows some ratios, like the percentage of citing documents within the whole, 
(column 9 - column 3 divided by column 2) and the percentage of the citing documents per 
precedent type within citing documents. (Column 10-14 – columns 4-8 divided by column 3). All of 
the 5 tables are sorted by the ratio of citing documents (column 9).  
 
 
                                                          
38 The published judgments of the local courts are not representative, and especially not from years 2011 and 
2012. The reason is twofold: 1. The publication mechanism of the court website. The main rule is, that the final 
judgments of the Curia and the Appellate Courts should be published, together with the connected first, (and in 
case of supervisory – cassation - decisions of the Curia second) instance decisions. In case of normal appellate 
(final) decisions of the Appellate Courts, the first instance is the County Court. Therefore, from this pile there is 
no Local Court decision at all from the database. Local Court decisions can get into the database, if a second 
instance final County Court decision is attacked in a supervisory (cassation) procedure at Curia, and it is 
published as a background of the cassation decision of it, as the first instance decision. 2. Furthermore, as local 
decisions are the first decisions in time, and the average time of procedure is 1 -1,5 years, a cassation decision 
of the Curia published in 2012 is typically finishing a case started in 2010 at a local court. This is the reason why 
there are so few local court decisions from 2011 and 2012.  
39 In the most widely used legal databases the important case-types, (in some, all case types except CC), can be 
inserted into the text of the law, visually offering a connected case.  
40 Since the tables show only the most frequent case types, there is a difference in the ratio of citing 
documents, compared to tables 3-7. For example the civil branch’s ratio in the summary table (7) is 37, while in 
table 10 40%. The difference is coming from the less frequent case types.  
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3.2. Civil department 
  
Total 
judgments 
Judgments 
with 
citations to 
precedents 
UD AO PD CD CC 
Ratio of 
citing 
documents 
Ratio of UD Ratio of AO Ratio of PD Ratio of CD Ratio of CC 
Libel cases 958 788 10 2327 17 136 576 82% 1% 295% 2% 17% 73% 
Termination of joint property 583 320 5 611 13 173 1 55% 2% 191% 4% 54% 0% 
Infringement of personal rights 2588 1377 10 1310 289 1051 1686 53% 1% 95% 21% 76% 122% 
Invalidity of contract 1724 761 229 458 276 1032 25 44% 30% 60% 36% 136% 3% 
Determination of ownership 1004 426 125 310 71 466 60 42% 29% 73% 17% 109% 14% 
Payment of contractual price 370 145 8 42 23 175 0 39% 6% 29% 16% 121% 0% 
Damage caused while exercising 
public powers 
542 171 9 84 48 179 34 32% 5% 49% 28% 105% 20% 
Damage compensation (Torts) 5903 1564 181 897 372 1253 385 26% 12% 57% 24% 80% 25% 
Repayment of loan 840 187 19 81 56 178 7 22% 10% 43% 30% 95% 4% 
Total 14512 5739 596 6120 1165 4643 2774 40% 10% 107% 20% 81% 48% 
 
Table 11 – Number of precedent-types, and ratios per case-type at civil department  
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3.2. Business department 
 
  
Total 
judgments 
Judgments 
with 
citations to 
precedents 
UD AO PD CD CC 
Ratio of 
citing 
documents 
Ratio of UD Ratio of AO Ratio of PD Ratio of CD Ratio of CC 
Invalidity of contract 436 217 94 160 90 228 16 50% 43% 74% 41% 105% 7% 
Determination of ownership 117 50 9 62 13 47 2 43% 18% 124% 26% 94% 4% 
Payment of contractual price 865 270 17 169 69 258 4 31% 6% 63% 26% 96% 1% 
Damage compensation (Torts) 1241 335 87 143 155 334 13 27% 26% 43% 46% 100% 4% 
Unfair market practices 121 32 7 0 20 29 0 26% 22% 0% 63% 91% 0% 
Repayment of debt 526 132 41 51 24 156 1 25% 31% 39% 18% 118% 1% 
Payment of purchase price 401 95 28 37 21 95 0 24% 29% 39% 22% 100% 0% 
Invalidity of a shareholders’ 
meeting resolution 
194 38 12 10 12 43 2 20% 32% 26% 32% 113% 5% 
Total 3901 1169 295 632 404 1190 38 30% 25% 54% 35% 102% 3% 
 
 
Table 12 – Number of precedent-types, and ratios per case-type at business department  
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3.3. Labour department 
  
Total 
judgments 
Judgments 
with 
citations to 
precedents 
UD AO PD CD CC 
Ratio of 
citing 
documents 
Ratio of UD Ratio of AO Ratio of PD Ratio of CD Ratio of CC 
Unlawful termination with 
immediate effect 
542 210 5 70 69 312 10 39% 2% 33% 33% 149% 5% 
Damage compensation payment 258 95 3 80 14 104 21 37% 3% 84% 15% 109% 22% 
Unlawful termination of 
employment contract 
1077 373 8 185 88 486 10 35% 2% 50% 24% 130% 3% 
Revision of Social insurance 
authority decisions 
257 60 4 21 18 49 0 23% 7% 35% 30% 82% 0% 
Total 2134 738 20 356 189 951 41 35% 3% 48% 26% 129% 6% 
 
Table 13 – Number of precedent-types, and ratios per case-type at labour department  
 
3.4. Administrative department 
  
Total 
judgments 
Judgments 
with 
citations to 
precedents 
UD AO PD CD CC 
Ratio of 
citing 
documents 
Ratio of UD Ratio of AO Ratio of PD Ratio of CD Ratio of CC 
Excise cases 181 72 0 37 7 66 0 40% 0% 51% 10% 92% 0% 
Tax cases 2603 849 43 316 177 894 93 33% 5% 37% 21% 105% 11% 
Expropriation cases 566 163 4 201 6 13 24 29% 2% 123% 4% 8% 15% 
Public procurement cases 750 195 9 182 9 33 6 26% 5% 93% 5% 17% 3% 
Broadcasting cases 395 96 9 59 7 16 103 24% 9% 61% 7% 17% 107% 
Construction permission cases 565 91 24 36 12 53 18 16% 26% 40% 13% 58% 20% 
Land registry cases 419 67 11 52 10 24 20 16% 16% 78% 15% 36% 30% 
Refugee cases 1022 145 0 145 0 1 0 14% 0% 100% 0% 1% 0% 
Total 6501 1678 100 1028 228 1100 264 26% 6% 61% 14% 66% 16% 
 
Table 14 – Number of precedent-types, and ratios per case-type at administrative department  
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3.5. Penal department 
 
  
Total 
judgments 
Judgments 
with 
citations to 
precedents 
UD AO PD CD CC 
Ratio of 
citing 
documents 
Ratio of UD Ratio of AO Ratio of PD Ratio of CD Ratio of CC 
Defamation 193 72 1 3 9 88 99 37% 1% 4% 13% 122% 138% 
Theft 340 115 107 53 11 102 3 34% 93% 46% 10% 89% 3% 
Forgery of public deeds 211 71 85 24 9 62 7 34% 120% 34% 13% 87% 10% 
Forgery of private deeds 458 139 139 87 14 126 5 30% 100% 63% 10% 91% 4% 
Robbery 368 99 48 25 11 104 5 27% 48% 25% 11% 105% 5% 
Bribery 473 127 39 89 7 126 24 27% 31% 70% 6% 99% 19% 
Fraud 321 82 10 52 13 109 2 26% 12% 63% 16% 133% 2% 
Misappropriation 332 79 32 36 6 75 2 24% 41% 46% 8% 95% 3% 
Homicide 871 179 35 115 8 261 1 21% 20% 64% 4% 146% 1% 
Battery 1575 299 57 136 11 476 8 19% 19% 45% 4% 159% 3% 
 Total 5142 1262 553 620 99 1529 156 25% 44% 49% 8% 121% 12% 
 
Table 15 – Number of precedent-types, and ratios per case-type at penal department  
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3.6. Conclusions 
 
Above, at II.1. I showed, that already the court level, and department has an impact on the use of 
precedents. (Upper courts and private law branches are citing more frequently precedents in their 
judgements.) These tables further deepen the picture.  
The first visible phenomenon is, that though the civil branches (civil, business, and labour) show a 
higher citation rate, their dispersion rate is extreme: there are some case types, where the citation 
ratio is 90%, while there are some where it is around 20. The dispersion rate of the public law 
branches is not so high, since the highest and the lowest rate in administrative court is 40 and 14%, 
and in penal 37 and 19% respectively.  
This means, that there are case types where practically every decision is citing a precedent.  
It is even more interesting to observe this together with the precedent types that the courts are 
citing. Since there is an obligatory instrument, (Uniformity Decision, UD), which is “officially more 
important” than other types, one would think that this is the most frequent citation-type, but that is 
not the case. In certain case-types there is no citation at all to uniformity decisions. This could have 
more reasons.  
One is, that the number of uniformity decision is low, and the “corpus” it is casuistic: there are a lot 
of fields, where there is no uniformity decision at all.  
Another reason becomes visible, if we observe the case of Constitutional Court decisions, (CC column 
14.), where there are extreme citation rates both in the positive, and in the negative range. Here the 
cause is visible: all the case types, where constitutional court decisions are popular, have some (or a 
great) connection with the basic rights, (Libel cases (73%), infringement of personal rights (122%) in 
civil branch, broadcasting cases (107%) in administrative branch, defamation (138%) in penal 
branch).  
A third reason is that if a certain precedent type is extremely popular, than other types’ citation ratio 
drops. It seems that the precedent types are interchangeable. This is a surprising fact, since these 
types are legally, and in their form very different. As I indicated above Uniformity Decisions (UD) are 
obligatory. Abstract Opinions (AO) are not, but they are longer in text, and they are comprising a 
broader topic. (Like a legal act). Court Decisions are, in format very similar to Principal Decisions, and 
Uniformity Decisions, but their number is very high (deciding one particular, narrow legal dilemma). 
But this all seems unimportant for the everyday practice. The authority of a decision is independent 
from its intended “legal force”, or from its place in the hierarchy of decisions. However it seems, that 
if there is an Abstract Opinion,  courts are preferring this: this is the situation in joint property cases, 
libel cases, personal rights infringement cases – these are all filed, where there is a “strong” Abstract 
Opinion. Where there is no AO, the practice uses CD and PD on the second place. Constitutional 
Court decisions are cited independently from the Supreme Court acts, in that field we do not see this 
correlation.  
At chapter III I will analyse the context of the citations, and other quantitative features, but it is 
already important to note, that Abstract Opinions are the kind of precedents that are the closer in 
format, and wording to the structure and logic of a traditional code. They are really law-replacement 
tools.  
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III. The qualitative research 
 
1. Methodology 
 
Though the number, structure and dispersion of the citations to precedents already can tell a lot 
about the use of precedents, it needs no further justification, that the precedential character of a 
legal system cannot be analysed only by automatic, statistical tools. Therefore, we selected a random 
sample from the decisions of the Capital Appellate Court (Appellate level), and the Supreme Court 
(Curia). Our method was very simple – we listed all the judgments of the three abovementioned 
court, and from the result lists, where 20 items were visible, we selected from every second result list 
the first items, from all departments. (That is we selected every 40th decision).  
The excel contains 520 upper court cases (with the preceding case) , which we read:  
 
Year of case 
Capital 
Appellate 
Court Curia Total 
2007 19 29 48 
2008 36 61 97 
2009 34 81 115 
2010 38 49 87 
2011 38 78 116 
2012 32 25 57 
Total 197 323 520 
 
Table 16 – Cases observed in the qualitative research 
 
We then filled out an Excel spreadheet, with the following data:  
1. The subject of the decision 
2. Citations  
3. History of the case (affirmed, dismissed, modified) 
4. The value of the case (if applicable)  
5. Treatment of the precedent (followed, distinguished, overruled) 
6. Treatment of citations of the lower court decision in appellate decision (ignore them, use 
them, or cite a new one.)  
7. Who cited first the decision? (court, or parties)    
 
The first two viewpoint is the same that was observed also in the quantitative research, and we only 
wanted to check the statistical data with manual tools. Other parameters are all such, that can be 
explored only after reading the text of the judgments.  
 
2. Some remarks on the style of the decisions (demonstration, inference, justification, 
reasoning) 
 
At this point I have to admit, that after knowing the results of the research I would put another point 
to the survey. This is “what part of the precedent is cited: anything form reasoning, only the 
headnote, or only the title (number) of the case”, and I would do the 6th question only for those, 
which cite the reasoning. I will explain this later.  
The reason of this is, because one of the conclusions of the survey was, that in most of the cases the 
precedents are cited very formally, and mechanically. Sometimes even the text of the headnote is 
missing, and only the number of the case is cited. (“The court took the CD No. …. into consideration), 
but in most of the cases courts are only citing the headnote of the cases as if these were texts of a 
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statute.  We have no exact data on this, but my estimation is, that the great majority of the citations 
(more than 90%) is either containing the headnote as a quotation, or parts of (sentences from) the 
headnote without explicit quotation, and less than 10% of the citations quote anything from the 
reasoning. As we will see later even if the case is distinguished, it is done with a stereotypical 
introductory formula. (“The court has not taken the CD No. … into consideration, because its facts 
are different from the recent case”). If the court analyses the reasoning, its reasoning is no longer 
than one paragraph, but rather typically a sentence.  
Moreover courts do not do two things. They do not see, and use the precedents as a network of 
arguments. I have seen only one case, (out of the 520) where a chain of arguments was developed 
based on previous cases, and this case was one applying EU law, and analysed the practice of the 
General Court of EU. Further, courts do not reformulate the ratio decidendi of the case in order to 
adapt it to the case in hand, in a way, how for example English courts often do it.  The reasoning in 
Hungarian decisions is either a demonstration. (Citation of the precedent without even citing any 
text), or shown as a logical inference, where headnote is cited as a quotation, and result (conclusion) 
is shown as a logical consequence of the decision.  
 
3. Results of the quantitative research 
 
3.1. Value of the case 
 
Value  
All 
judgements 
Number of 
citations41 % 
Small (under 1M HUF)  220 55 25% 
Medium (between 1 and 10 M HUF)  126 36 29% 
Big (more than 10M HUF) 71 22 31% 
Undetermined42  103 184 179% 
Total 520 297 57% 
 
Table 17 – The value of the case, and the citations 
 
One of our hypothesis was, that value of the case, the “money in stake” has an effect on the 
“cognitive battle” and it is influencing the number of citations.  This is not justifiable. Though the 
number of citations is increasing slightly as the value is growing, this is not the decisive factor: the 
frequency of citations is determined mostly by the field of law, or the case type.  
  
                                                          
41 Note, that this figure is not the number of documents, (like e.g. Table 3-7), but ratio of citations, similar to 
Table 10-14s column 10-14.  
42 Most of the “undetermined value” cases are: criminal, administrative (where the subject of the case is the 
supervision of a decision of a state organ), or labour, (where the illicit termination of the labour contract is in 
question), or infringement of personal rights. The latter two is very precedent-intensive – that is why the 
undetermined group has the highest citation ratio.  
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3.2. Distinguishing 
 
Number of decisions 520 
Contains citation 157 
Number of all citations 297 
Precedent followed 283 
Precedent distinguished  14 
 
Table 18 – Number of precedents distinguished 
 
It is not surprising, and partly following from the above-mentioned facts, that precedents in 95% are 
cited in a positive context.  If the court is distinguishing the case, it does it in a very mechanical way, 
mostly using the same stereotypical phrases. We have not found any cases, where there was an 
explicit overruling.  
 
3.3. Treatment of citations of the lower court 
 
Number of decisions 520 
Contains citation 157 
Number of all citations by the upper court 297 
Number of all citations by the lower court 104 
Citation mentioned in a positive context by the upper court 51 
“Agreement ratio” in precedents 49% 
No. affirmed cases43 377 
Affirmation ratio 73% 
 
Table 19 – Treatment of citations of the lower courts in the context of the history of the case 
 
As it was stated before lower courts are citing less precedents than upper courts. (In our case, 297 
citations in 520 judgments, vs. 104 citations by the lower courts.) The surprising result of the table is, 
that typically they do not cite the same precedents as lower courts, because from the 297 citations of 
the upper courts, only 51 cited the same precedent. Or, to put it in another way, only the half of the 
citations of the lower courts are cited by the upper courts, (half of them is ignored), but another 246, 
totally different citations are inserted on the second (third) instance. Thus, typically the story is, that 
from two citations of the lower court one is ignored, and two more newly inserted. This number is 
even more surprising, if we compare it with the affirmation ratio of the upper courts, which is overall 
73%.  
  
                                                          
43 Just for the sake of completeness, the overall treatment of cases by the upper courts (question 6. at the 
beginning of Chapter III.) within the total pile was the following:  
Affirmed in cassation 
procedure 184 
Affirmed in appellate 
procedure 193 
Dismissed in cassation 
procedure 37 
Dismissed in appellate 
procedure 7 
Modified 99 
Total 520 
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3.4. By whom the precedent is cited, taken into the argumentation?  
 
At lower courts   
By the court 83 80% 
By the parties  21 20% 
Total 104 100% 
At upper courts     
By lower court, and upper court 
agrees 
51 17% 
By upper court 190 64% 
Parties 56 19% 
Total 297 100% 
 
Table 20 -  By whom the precedent was brought into the reasoning 
 
It was an important question for us, that who has taken the citation into the procedure. Who 
initiated the use of a precedent. Unfortunately for this question we have not found a clear answer. 
The initiator of the precedent does not turn out clearly from the text of the decision. In most of the 
cases there is no sing of the source. In some cases the court indicates, that this was proposed by the 
party, ( “Defendant cited the CD No ……,”) or was used by the lower court (“The first instance court 
cited properly CD No….”).  In this particular question, for a better picture, the text of the petitions 
should have been studied too.  
 
4. Final conclusions 
 
First I have to state that everything which is written above is primarily valid for the Hungarian judicial 
system – but I think, it has a lot to do with all civilian legal systems. Hereby I would only repeat those 
statements, which could have a general significance.  
Precedents seem to be an important part of the legal reasoning of the Hungarian courts, and 
citations to the precedents is significantly increasing in time. (From 27% to 40%, between 2007 and 
2012; in average 33%) If trends will continue, within a few years more than half of all decisions will 
contain a precedent-citation.  
Upper courts, and private law branches cite more frequently, but the basic determining factor of 
precedent-frequency is the case type. In certain case-types practically all decisions contain a citation 
to a precedent.  
Though there are different precedent types, and these are legally, and in their binding force are very 
different, the everyday judicial practice of the courts handle them as interchangeable. If there is a 
binding Uniformity Decision, the court will use that, but if there is no such, it cites the Abstract 
Opinions, or the Court Decisions from the official collection, or even uses the cases published in the 
private collections.   
Though there is no stare decisis, if the particular case-type requires, courts do use the precedents 
without binding force. Therefore from this point of view stare decisis is not a decisive factor when 
courts are citing a precedent. The other side of this coin is, that courts do not have to reflect on the 
proposals of the parties – they can simply ignore them.  
The ratio – dicta distinction is existing in a very strange form. Courts are nearly exclusively citing the 
official headnotes of the decisions, and it is very rare, that they cite anything else. One can say, that 
this headnote is the ratio of the precedent. But since the wording of the headnote is very similar to 
the wording of an amendment in a statute, these texts are cited exactly similarly to law-texts. 
Reasoning – reflecting the long standing tradition of civilian systems - is not a rhetorical effort, but 
shows itself as a logical inference.  
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There is no distinguishing, and no any other sophisticated approaches to a case, what we can see in 
on the 6th page. Approach to cases is binary. If the case cited by the party does not fit to the 
“inference” of the court it simply ignores it. If it fits, the court will cite it like a text from a law. The 
outstanding popularity of Abstract Decisions, which are “regulating” a particular field of law, and 
their “statute-like” wording illustrates this tendency.  
Consequently, there is no such as the “spirit of the rule what counts, and not the wording”. 
Hungarian law is textual, text-based, and text bound. The importance of precedents is growing in 
number, and if this is a sign of convergence, than there is a convergence. But the textual tradition of 
the civilian law is very strong, and the sophisticated ways of precedent handling, and reasoning is 
simply not present in Hungarian law.  What happens, I think is, that it is not that the whole legal 
system (including legal method) is slowly getting a precedential character. It is rather, that more and 
more precedents are published, these are more and more widely used, and there is a quantitative 
change: but these precedents are used with the traditional method of logical inference-like style: the 
style of statutory text usage of the civilian systems.  
